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LABOR LAW: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY
TO BARGAIN OVER JOB TERMINATION DECISIONs-First National

Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (the
Act), as amended,l mandates that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees. . . ."2 The nature and scope of the duty to bar
gain collectively is set forth in section 8(d) of the Act: "[t]o bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation. . .to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment. . . ."3
One of the most critical yet uncertain issues regarding this statu
tory obligation concerns the scope of the bargaining duties arising
out of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."4 The Na
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which administers the Act,
and the courts of appeals, which are empowered to enforce NLRB
decisions, have taken divergent views of the proper scope of these
duties. 5 The rift between the NLRB and the courts is particularly
I. Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(a)(5), 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(5) (1976) [here
inafter cited as the Act].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(3) (1976) imposes a reciprocal
duty on the employees' representative with regard to the employer. It provides, in rele
vant part, "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents. . .
to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer. . . ." ld.
3.. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976). Section 158(d) reads, in part, as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession . . . .
ld. See notes 145-48 infra and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of what
the duty to bargain in good faith requires.
4. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976).
5. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 75-88 infra. Any person, employer, or union
may file an unfair labor practice charge if they believe the Act has been violated. Unless
the charge clearly is without merit the NLRB will conduct an investigation of the charge
and then hold informal settlement proceedings. If the claim cannot be settled informally,
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acute when each interprets the bargaining obligations of employers
making decisions that result in job terminations. 6 In First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,7 the United States Supreme Court, for
the first time in seventeen years, attempted to interpret this statutory
phrase in such a context. The result is a landmark decision that is
likely to halt, if not reverse, the tendency of the NLRB and the re
cent trend in the courts of appeals to interpret broadly the scope of
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."8
This case note will place First National in historical perspective
by tracing the development of the scope of an employer's duty to
bargain over economically motivated decisions that directly result in
the loss of jobs. The conflict between the NLRB and the courts re
garding the proper interpretation of the statutory obligation to bar
gain over "terms and conditions of employment" will be outlined.
Next, First National will be analyzed. The potential scope of First
National and its impact on the historical development of the em
ployer's duty to bargain over job termination decisions will be con
sidered. Finally, the implications of First National for the labor law
practitioner will be discussed.
II.
A.

FIRST NATIONAL

Facts

Petitioner, First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM),
was engaged in the business of providing housekeeping, mainte
nance, and related services for commercial customers in the New
York City area. 9 FNM provided each of its customers with on prem
ises labor and supervision in return for reimbursement of its labor
costs and payment of a fixed fee. \0 A separate labor force was hired
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALl) is required. The decision of the
ALl may be appealed to the NLRB in Washington, D.C. The NLRB's decision may
then be appealed to the United States Courts of Appeals by the losing party. The losing
party may also indirectly seek judicial review by refusing to comply with the NLRB's
order. The Act does not grant the NLRB any self-enforcement powers. The NLRB,
therefore, must petition the courts of appeals for review and enforcement of any orders
that are not voluntarily complied with. When reviewing NLRB decisions, the courts of
appeals must accept as true the findings of fact of the NLRB, if they are supported by
substantial evidence. The holding of the court of appeals may then be appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 7-20
(1976) for a more detailed discussion of the structure and procedures of the NLRB.
6. See notes 74-88 infra and accompanying text.
7. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
9. 452 U.S. at 668.
10. Id.
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for each customer, and the personnel were not transferred to other
customer locations.ll On April 28, 1976, FNM entered into a con
tract with the Greenpark Care Center (Greenpark), a Brooklyn nurs
ing home. 12 In return for FNM maintenance services, Greenpark
agreed to pay FNM five hundred dollars a week above its labor
costs.13 The five hundred dollar fee was reduced to two hundred and
fifty dollars by mutual agreement on November I, 1976. 14
By the spring of 1977, petitioner realized that it was losing
money on this contract and, on June 30, 1977, requested that its
weekly fee be restored to five hundred dollars.15 On July 6, 1977,
FNM notified Greenpark that unless the requested fee increase was
granted, FNM would use its contractual right to cancel the contract
and to discontinue operations on August I, 1977. 16
While petitioner was experiencing these difficulties, District
1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Re
tail, Wholesale, and Department Store' Union, AFL-CIO (the
union), organized FNM's Greenpark employees and was elected and
certified as their representative for collective bargaining.l7 On July
12, 1977, the union vice-president, Edward Wecker, notified FNM
that the union had been certified to represent the Greenpark employ
ees and requested that collective bargaining negotiations begin. IS
FNM never responded. 19
On July 28, 1977, FNM notified its thirty-five Greenpark em
ployees that they would be discharged in three days.20 Wecker im
mediately telephoned petitioner to request a delay of the discharges
for the purpose of bargaining. 21 He was told that the termination of
the Greenpark operation was due purely to financial considerations,
that the decision was final, and that the notice provision of the con
tract made continuing beyond August I, 1977, prohibitively expen
sive. 22 On July 31, 1977, petitioner discontinued its Greenpark
Id.
Id.
13. Id.
14. /d.
15. Id. at 669.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 669-70. The FNM contract with Greenpark contained a clause requiring
30 days notice of intent to cancel. The contract also provided that staying on past the
thirtieth day following notice would nullify the notice and require FNM to continue
II.
12.
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operation and discharged the employees. 23
B. Litigation History

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB,
claiming that FNM's failure to bargain over its decision to close
down its Greenpark operation was a violation of section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. 24 The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petitioner
violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act both by refusing to bargain over its
decision to terminate the Greenpark contract and by refusing to bar
gain over the effect of that change upon union employees. 25 The
judge reasoned that "the discharge of a man is a change in his condi
tions of employment. . .. In these obvious facts, the law is clear."26
Hence, when an employer "wishes to alter the hiring arrange
ments...the law is...clear that he must first talk to the union
about it."27 The judge recommended that the NLRB order FNM to
bargain in good faith with the union about both the decision and its
effects. The judge also recommended a back pay award for the em
ployees from the time of discharge until the time impasse or agree
ment was reached. 28 The NLRB, without further analysis, adopted
the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and, in addition, re
quired petitioner to offer reinstatement to all discharged
employees. 29
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en
forced the NLRB order, although it adopted a different analysis. 30
The court reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate because the
parameters of the duty to bargain over job termination decisions
were not clearly defined by either the Act or Supreme Court prece
work for at least another 30 days. Since FNM had given notice, they did not want to stay
beyond the August I st cancellation date. Based upon financial concerns, FNM claimed
. it was not in a position to discuss the matter with the Union. Id. See First Nat'!. Mainte
nance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452
U.S. 666 (1981).
23. 452 U.S. at 670.
24. Id.
25. 242 N.L.R.B. at 462 (1979).
26. Id. at 465.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 466. For the detailed list of contingencies that will end further back pay
liability, see id.
29. 452 U.S. 671-72. The NLRB ordered FNM to effectuate reinstatement either
by resuming its Greenpark operations or by discharging subsequently hired employees at
its other operations. Id.
30. NLRB v. First Nat'!. Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980) (2-1 deci
sion), rev'd, 452 U.S. 661 (1981).
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dent. 3) The court decided that the proper approach was to create a
presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining over such a deci
sion.32 This presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating that
"the purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of
the duty to bargain."33 The economic problems of FNM were not
considered sufficiently serious to render collective bargaining futile.
As a result, the court concluded the presumption in favor of bargain
ing was not rebutted. 34
The Supreme Court granted certiorari35 "[bJecause of the im
portance of the issue and the continuing disagreement between and
among the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals. . . ."36 The Court
reversed the decision of the Second Circuit and thereby rejected the
presumption of a duty to bargain over partial plant closing deci
sions. 37 The Court reasoned that the potential harm to an em
ployer's ability to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down
part of its business for economic reasons outweighs any benefits that
might be gained through the union's participation in making the de
cision. 38 The Court, therefore, held that "the decision itself is not
part of § 8(d),s 'terms and conditions' . . . over which Congress has
mandated bargaining."39 In order to analyze this decision accurately
31. 627 F.2d at 600-02. The court stated: "Although the rationale of Fibreboard is
not altogether clear, we believe that the decision at least supports the rejection of a per se
rule imposing a duty to bargain, since such a rigid approach would ignore additional
relevant considerations. . . ." Id. at 601.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court then proceeded to give some examples of situations where the
purposes of the Act would not be furthered by requiring bargaining. The employer
might overcome the presumption by demonstrating that: .
bargaining over the decision would be futile, since the purposes of the statute
would not be served by ordering the parties to bargain when it is clear that the
employer's decision cannot be changed. Other relevant considerations would
be that the closing was due to emergency financial circumstances, or that the
custom of the industry ... is not to bargain over such decisions. The presump
tion might also be rebutted if it could be demonstrated that forcing the em
ployer to bargain would endanger the vitality of the entire business.
Id. at 601-02.
34. Id. at 602. The court stated: "[A]lthough certain considerations generally re
lating to economics may render bargaining futile and therefore nonobligatory, FNM has
not shown that to be true of the considerations it claims prompted its decision to termi
nate the Greenpark operation." Id. (footnote omitted).
35. 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
36. 452 U.S. at 674.
37. Id. at 688. See note 123 infra for a more detailed discussion of this point.
38. 452 U.S. at 686.
39. Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court agreed, however, that the
NLRB and the Second Circuit were correct in finding a duty to bargain over the effects
of the decision. Id. at 677 n.15.
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and to understand its potential implications for the duty to bargain
over other kinds of job termination decisions, it is necessary first to
review the historical development of collective bargaining law.
III.
A.

HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER "TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT"

Early Developments

When the Labor Management Relations Act was amended in
1947, the House proposed language which specifically delineated the
topics over which the employer had a duty to bargain. 4o Congress
rejected this proposed language and instead decided to use the
phrase, ''wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ
ment."41 The rationale for using such broad, flexible language was
based upon the belief that "[t]he appropriate scope of collective bar
gaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably depend
upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at
any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many
related factors."42
This approach proved to be effective as it allowed the scope of
the duty to bargain to grow and change as the collective bargaining
system matured. 43 Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, the
40. The House bill stated that neither party would be required to discuss any sub
ject matter other than:
(i) wage rates, hours of employment and work requirements; (ii) procedures
and practices relating to discharge, suspension, layoff, recall, seniority, disci
pline, promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment with the bargaining unit;
(iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and pro
tection of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of ab
sence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the
foregoing subjects.
See H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(2)(11) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 40
(1948).
41. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976).
42. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947), reprinted in, I NLRB LEGIS
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 362 (1948).
43. See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th
Cir.), cerf. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (company housing); Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401
F.2d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (profit sharing plants);
NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Ass'n Gen. Contractors, Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966) (employment security); Richfield Oil Corp. v.
NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (stock purchase
arrangement); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (insurance
plans); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), affd sub nom,
American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (pensions); NLRB v.I.
H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948)
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vagueness of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"
caused conflict between the NLRB and the federal courts. This was
particularly true in the area of management decisions that resulted in
employee job 10ss.44 The conflict stemmed from divergent views of
the manner in which the duty to bargain collectively should be bal
anced with the need for management's freedom to act. 45
Initially, the tendency of both the NLRB and the courts was to
consistently strike the balance in favor of management's right to
make job termination decisions without having to bargain~46 In
(merit wage increases). See also Note, Labor Law-Plant Closing As A Subject of
Mandatory Bargaining, 4 AM. J. TR. ADv. 800, 801 n.31 (1981).
44. See notes 75-88 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Ozark Trailers Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566-67 (1966).
With all respect to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits, we
do not believe that the question whether a particular management decision
must be bargained about should tum on whether the decision involves the com
mitment of investment capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involv
ing 'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business. An
employer's decision to make a 'major' change in the nature of his business, such
as the termination of a position thereof, is also of significance for those employ
ees whose jobs will be lost by the termination. For, just as the employer has
invested capital in the business, so the employee has invested years of his work
ing life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills
that mayor may not be salable to another employer. . . . And, just as the em
ployer's interest in the protection of his capital investment is entitled to consid
eration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is the employees interest in the
protection of his livelihood. . . .
In short, we see no reason why employees should be denied the right to
bargain about a decision directly affecting terms and conditions of employment
which is of profound significance for them solely because that decision is also a
significant one for management.
Id. See also Naylor, Subcontracting, Plant Closures and Plant Removals: The Duty to
Bargain and Its Practical Implications Upon the Employment Relationship, 30 DRAKE L.
REV. 203, 217 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Subcontracting).
46. There have been scattered NLRB decisions claiming the employer had a duty
to bargain over subcontracting decisions. See Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494
(1959); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946). Most authorities, however,
agree that the dicta in Town and Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962) which the
N.L.R.B. adopted in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on
rehearing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enj'orced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd, 379
U.S. 203 (1964), was the first time this position was clearly stated and followed. See
Murphy, Plant Relocation and the Collective Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C. L. REv. 5
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Plant Relocation). "For the first twenty-seven years of the
Act, until Fibreboard II in 1962, the Board usually (but not invariably) found a violation
of § 8(a)(5) in operational changes only when anti-union motivation could be inferred."
Id. at 7; Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination ofBargaining Unit Work: The Search for
Standards in Defining the Scope 0/ the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 808
(1971); Note, National Labor Relations A ct-Subcontracting as Mandatory Subject of Col
lective Bargaining, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1965); Note, Labor La_
Mandatory Bargaining, 26 U. PIIT. L. REv. 651 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor
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1962, this trend was reversed by the NLRB in Town and Country
Manufacturing CO.47 Dicta from Town and Country indicated that
the employer had a duty to bargain over its decision to subcontract
its trailer hauling operation and to discharge its drivers. 48 In light of
this, the NLRB agreed to reconsider its earlier holding in Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. 49
B.

Fibreboard

In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,50 the employer
subcontracted the work of his maintenance department to an in
dependent contractor who agreed to do the same work at a lower
COSt. 51 The entire bargaining unit of maintenance employees was
discharged and replaced by the employees of the subcontractor. 52
Upon rehearing, the NLRB held that the employer had a duty to
bargain over his decision to subcontract the work of his maintenance
department to an independent maintenance service. 53 This holding
was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia54 and the United States Supreme Court. 55 The Supreme
Court affirmance led to a seventeen year conflict between the NLRB
and the courts. 56 The Supreme Court, in affirming the finding of the
NLRB and the court of appeals, held that the employer had a duty
to bargain over the subcontracting decision before he implemented
it. 57 The Court held:
[t]he type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the replace
ment of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an
independent contractor to do the same work under similar condiLaw). "Fibreboard represents the first time the court has upheld the Board position ini
tially enunciated in Town & Country Mfg. Co. -that management must negotiate its deci
sions to subcontract. ..." Id. at 654.
47. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). (The com
pany decided to subcontract out the work of its truck drivers to an independent concern.)
48. Id. at 1027-28. "[E)ven if Respondent's subcontract was impelled by economic
or I.e.e. considerations, we would nevertheless find that Respondent violated § 8(a)(5)
by failing to fulfill its mandatory obligation to consult with the Union regarding its deci
sion to subcontract." Id.
49. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on rehearing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), en
forced, 322F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
50. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
51. Id. at 206-07.
52. Id. at 207.
53. Id. at 208.
54. 322 F.2d 411 (D.e. Cir. 1963), affd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
55. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
56. See notes 75-77, 88 infra and accompanying text.
57. 379 U.S. at 215.
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tions of employment-is a statutory subject of collective bargain
ing under [section] 8(d). Our decision need not and does not
encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting"
which arise daily in our complex economy. 58

Although the holding was narrow, 59 the decision generated tre
mendous controversy over the potential impact of the duty to bar
gain on other job termination decisions. The controversy arose
because the language and reasoning of the decision, taken as a
whole, were potentially broad and far reaching. 60 The Court's state
ment that "[t]he words 'conditions of employment'. . .plainly cover
the termination of employment. .. "61 has been adopted by the
NLRB and broadly interpreted to mean that all employer decisions
that result in job termination are subject to a mandatory duty to bar
gain under section 8(d) of the Act. 62 The courts of appeals, on the
other hand, have chosen to read the decision narrowly, often turning
for support to the concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart. 63
Justice Stewart's concurrence sought to limit the sweeping language
used by the majority.64 He concluded:
58. Id. See Note, Labor Law, supra note 46, at 634.
Fibreboard represents the first time the Coun has upheld the Board position
initially enunciated in Town & Country Mfg. Co. -that management must nego
tiate its decision to subcontract although the decision is based on economic
rather than anti-union motives. By its holding the Coun has continued the
Board's trend of giving unions an increasingly stronger voice in the making of
management decisions which might affect the employees status. The result is
that now the employer not only must negotiate the effects of a decision to sub
contract (termination benefits, etc.), he also must negotiate the basic decision
itself.
Id
59. Id.
60. See Note, Subcontracting, Mandatory Bargaining and the 1965 N.L.RB. Deci
sion, 18 STAN. L. REV. 256, 257 (1965).
A catalyst of the confusion that seems to prevail in the general area of subcon

tracting is language in Fibreboard which can be construed to suggest (1) that
subcontracting as a general matter is a mandatory subject for bargaining; and
(2) that every managerial decision which results in termination of employment
is a mandatory subject to bargaining.
Id See also notes 64-87 infra and accompanying text.
61. 379 U.S. at 210.
62. See text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
63. 379 U.S. at 218. (Stewan, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 75-76,
88 infra for more detail on the coun of appeals interpretation of this concurrence.
64. 379 U.S. at 218 (Stewan, J., concurring). "(T]he Coun's opinion radiates im
plications of such disturbing breadth that I am persuaded to file this separate statement
of my own views." Id.
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[I]t surely does not follow that every decision which may affect job
security is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. . . .
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital
and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primar
ily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the deci
sion may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think
clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to
the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions
which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enter
prise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security
should be excluded from that area. 65
C.

Post Fibreboard
1.

Darlington

The year after Fibreboard the Supreme Court decided Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. ,66 which served to
define the outer limits of Fibreboard. In Darlington, the employer
closed his plant operations and discharged all plant employees in
retaliation for unionizing. 67 Section 8(a)(3)68 of the Act makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in
tenure of employment against those who join a union. Therefore,
the issue before the Court was whether an employer could terminate
his business for anti-union motives without violating the Act. 69 The
Court held that an employer is free to close his entire business for
any reason he desires. 70 The language used was so broad that it has
been concluded that an employer who goes completely out of busi
ness has no duty to bargain with the collective bargaining represen
tative of the employees concerning his decision. 7l Hence, Darlington
65. Id. at 223.
66. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
67. Id. at 266.
68. 29 U.S.c. § 158(a)(3) (1976). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair la
bor practice for an employer...by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization. . . ." Id.
69. 380 U.S. at 268-69.
70. Id. at 268. "We hold that so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an
employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he
pleases. . . ." Id.
71. See Heinsz, The Partial-Closing Conundrum: The Duty of Employers and Un
ions to Bargain in Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 71. "In view of the Darlington decision,
the Board has conceded that no duty exists to bargain over a decision to close com
pletely." Id. at 78 n.54. "[L]ittle question exists that the employer may unilaterally liqui
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defined the outer reaches of the broad language in Fibreboard, which
had implied that all job termination decisions clearly are within the
scope of the statutory requirement to bargain regarding terms and
conditions of employment. 72
In the sixteen years that have elapsed since .Darlington, the
Supreme Court refused to further define the scope of Fibreboard and
the duty to bargain over decisions that result in job termination. 73
The courts and the NLRB were left on their own to define the proper
scope of this duty. The result has been nearly two decades of conflict
as the courts, for the most part, have strongly resisted the NLRB's
attempts to broadly construe this duty.74
2.

The Conflict

In 1965, the courts of appeals had their first opportunities to
apply Fibreboard. In cases involving partial closing and subcon
tracting situations, the Third and Eighth Circuits found no duty to
bargain over the job termination decisions in spite of Fibreboard.7 5
In each case the courts relied on the limiting language of Fibreboard,
particularly Justice Stewart's concurrence. 76
Within a year, the NLRB came forward and explicitly rejected
the approach of the courts. In Ozark Trailers, Inc. ,77 a partial plant
closing case, the NLRB said:
With all respect to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Eighth Circuits, we do not believe that the question whether a par
ticular management decision must be bargained about should tum
date his entire business based upon economic or anti-union motivations."
Subcontracting, supra note 45, at 226.
72. See note 71 supra.
73. The First National decision was the next case in which the Court dealt with
these issues. See notes 98-127 infta and accompanying text.
74. See Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 17-18.
At the risk of oversimplification, the response of the judiciary to Fibreboard can
be summed up in a·sing1e word: unfriendly. The courts generally, but not uni
formly, have rejected Board attempts to extend decision-bargaining to opera
tional changes other than to factual situations similar to the subcontracting
involved in Fibreboard."
Id.
75. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. lOll (1966);
NLRB v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
76. See NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3rd Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 109-11 (8th Cir. 1965), uri. denied, 382 U.S.
lOll (1966); NLRB v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 901-02 (8th
Cir. 1965).
77. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
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on whether the decision involves the commitment of investment
capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involving 'major'
or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business. . . .
An employer's decision to make a 'major' change in the nature of
his business, such as the termination of a position thereof, is also
of significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the
termination. For, just as the employer has invested capital in the
business, so the employee has invested years of his working
life. . . . And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of .
his capital investment is entitled to consideration in our interpre
tation of the Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection
of his livelihood. . . . In short, we see no reason why employees
should be denied the right to bargain about a decision directly
affecting the terms and conditions of employment which is of
profound significance for them. . . .78
Since Ozark Trailers, the NLRB, with few exceptions,79 has re
lied on broad interpretations of Fibreboard. 80 The NLRB has con
sistently held that virtually all decisions resulting in job terminations
must be bargained over by the employer and the employees' repre
sentative. Employer decisions to automate operations,81 to use in-'
dependent contractors,82 to relocate,83 or to partially close a plant 84
have been held to require collective bargaining with the employees'
bargaining representative. The interpretation of Fibreboard adopted
78. Id. at 566-67.
79. Five years after Ozark Trailers, it seemed that the NLRB had overruled this
doctrine in General Motors Corp. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
The NLRB held there was no duty to bargain over a decision to sell a dealership because
the matter lay "at the very core of entrepreneurial control." Id. at 952. Summit Tooling
Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972) was seen as a further retreat from Ozark Trailers. Then, in
1974, the NLRB decided Royal Typewriter Co., 209 NLRB 1006 (1974), where it dist
inguished General MOlors and clearly stated that it did not overrule Ozark Trailers. Id.
at 1012. See Planl Relocalion, supra note 46, at 5. "In essence, except for General Mo
lors, which the Board has sought to limit, the Board has adopted a pro-bargaining
stance, emphasizing that such decisions [partial plant closings and plant relocations] fall
within the ambit of the 'terms and conditions of employment.''' Id. at 19.
80. See Planl Relocalion, supra note 46, at 19. As recently as June 22, 1981, the
Supreme Court in Firsl Nalional noted that the NLRB made its decision in Firsl Nalional
"[r]elying on Ozark Trailers, Inc." 452 U.S. at 670.
81. See, e.g., Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 91 (1969); Northwest Publishing Co.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1963), enforced, 343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965).
82. See, e.g., Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962) enforcemenl denied, 350
F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cerro denied., 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
83. See, e.g., Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965).
84. See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1977), enforcemenl
denied, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966);
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964).
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by the NLRB has been labeled the per se approach. 85 The rationale
of this approach is that because Fibreboard said that the terms and
conditions of employment under Section 8(d) plainly cover the ter
mination of employment,86 a decision by management that results in
job terminations, by its very nature, must be subject to the Section
8(d) requirement to bargain in good faith over terms and conditions
of employment.87
The courts rejected the NLRB's broad interpretation and con
tinued to strictly interpret Justice Stewart's narrow concurrence in
Fibreboard. 88 Recent courts of appeals decisions, however, have
adopted a broader reading of Fibreboard, particularly in partial
plant closing situations. In 1978, the Third Circuit became the first
to adopt a presumption in favor of a duty to bargain over job termi
nation decisions. 89 In Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB,90 the
per se approach of the NLRB was rejected but the use ofa rebuttable
presumption of a duty to bargain over a partial closing of an em
ployer's operations was advocated. 91 Less than two years later, the
85. See, e.g., 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
720, 731-34 (1978).
86. 379 U.S. at 210.
87. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 731-34 (1978); Sub
contracting, supra note 45 at 203. "[T)he Board has generally required the employer to
bargain with the union representative, regardless of the purity of the employers' eco
nomic motivation, if the decision has a substantial effect on the employment security of
the company's employees." Id. at 214.
88. Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 5. "The judiciary, however, fastening on the
limiting language of Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, usually but not invariably, has
come down on the side of management." Id. at 19; see, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v.
NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th cir. 1976); International Machinist Ass'n. v. North East Air
lines, 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972).
89. Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978).
90. 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 735.
Just as subcontracting is likely to lead to the termination of employment, so too
will the closing down of an employer's plant-and thus the latter act 'might
appropriately be called a condition of employment.'
Accordingly, it would seem that there is an initial presumption founded on
the statutory purposes and language, that a partial closing is a mandatory sub
ject of bargaining. However, as earlier pointed out, any such presumption con
strued as a per se rule . . . .
Id. (emphasis in original) For a more complete discussion of Brockway see Comment,
Employer's /Juty to Bargain Over A Partial Closure, Brockway M~tor Trucks v. NLRB,
528 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978), 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 747 (1979); Note, Duty to Bar
gain About Termination of Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 768 (1979); Note, Labor La_Duty to Bargain Over Partial Closing Decisions
Brockway Motor Trucks, Division of Mack Trucks, Inc., v. NLRB, 28 KAN. L. REV. 157
(1979).
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Seventh Circuit, in Davis v. NLRB,92 went even further and, in ef
fect, adopted the NLRB's per se approach. 93 The Seventh Circuit
held that the decision to convert a restaurant from full-service to
self-service, which resulted in the termination of six waitresses, was
subject to the duty to bargain under Section 8(d).94
Within four months of Davis, the Second Circuit continued this
trend of liberal interpretation of Fibreboard with First National. 95
The court decided that Fibreboard dictated that a presumption in
favor of a duty to bargain exists for partial plant closing decisions. 96
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of this conflict
over the proper interpretation of Fibreboard and the proper scope of
management's duty to bargain over economically motivated deci
sions that result in job terminations. 97
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court Decision

In First National, the Supreme Court focused on the fundamen
tal goal of the Labor Management Relations Act in analyzing the
bargaining duties of an employer in deciding to close part of his
business. 98 That goal is to maintain industrial peace in order to pre
serve the free flow of interstate commerce. 99 Congress sought to pro
mote collective bargaining between employers and representatives of
their employees as the means to achieve this goa1. 1OO The Court,
92.

617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1268. They reasoned that "the closing of a full service restaurant. ..is a
'condition of employment' for purposes of the Act because such a decision leads to the
termination of at least some employees." Id.
94. Id. at 1270.
95. 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
96. Id. at 601.
We also agree with the Brockway court that the correct approach is to establish
a presumption that a duty to bargain exists. A partial closing affects 'terms and
conditions of employment' at least as much as does the decision to contract out
which the Fibreboard Court found to fall within the literal meaning of the
statute.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. 452 U.S. at 674. For additional discussion of the conflict between the NLRB
and the courts of appeals, see id. at 672-74; Brockway Motors Trucks, Inc., 582 F.2d at
727·35; 5 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW, § 20 at 151·75 (Bender ed. 1981); Subcontracting, supra
note 45, at 213·17; Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 12·20.
98. 452 U.S. at 674.
99. Id. "A fundamental aim of the Labor Management Relations Act is the estab·
lishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate com
merce." Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones Loughlin Street Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937».
100. Id. "Central to the achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective
93.
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however, emphasized that while parties can choose to bargain over
any legal subject, Congress expressly limited the subjects over which
parties must bargain. 101 The Congressional premise that "collective
[bargaining] discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons
will result in decisions that are better for both management and la
bor and for society as a whole will be true, however, only if the sub
ject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process." 102 The Court, therefore, concluded that there is
an undeniable limit to the subjects over which Congress intended to
make bargaining mandatory.103
The Court determined that" 'the limitation includes only issues
that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and
the employees.' "104 This standard then was used to divide manage
rial decisions into three categories. lOS Decisions that have only an
indirect impact on the employment relationship were held to carry
with them no duty to bargain lO6 while decisions that have a direct
focus and impact on some aspect of the employment relationship
were found to be clearly within the scope of the duty to bargain. I07
bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor and manage
ment." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 678.
103. Id. at 676.
104. Id. (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971».
Section 8(a) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for
mandatory bargaining. . . .But it does establish a limitation against which pro
posed topics must be measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only
issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and the
employees.
Id. (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971».
105. Id. at 676-77.
Some management decisions, such as choice of advertising and promotion,
product type and design, and financing arrangements, have only an indirect and
attenuated impact on the employment relationship. See Fibreboard, 379 U.S.,
at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Other management decisions, such as the order
of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules, are al
most exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and em
ployee. Chemical Workers, 404 U.S. at 178. The present case concerns a third
type of management decision, one that had a direct impact on employment,
since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but had as its focus
only the economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a concern under
these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 677.
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Decisions, such as the type made by FNM, having a direct impact on
the employment relationship, are not subject to a per se rule as they
focus on factors wholly apart from the employment relationship. 108
They must, however, be subjected to a balancing test in order to de
termine whether there is a duty to bargain over them. 109
The Court prefaced its discussion of this balancing approach
with language that gave strong recognition to the interests of man
agement. It stated that Congress did not intend the scope of the duty
to bargain to be so broad "that the elected union representative
would become an equal partner in the running of the business enter
prise in which the union's members are employed."IIO The Court
determined: "Management must be free from the constraints of the
bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profita
ble business." III The decisions within this realm were classified as
those which are not "amenable to resolution through the bargaining
process." I 12
The Court developed its balancing test based upon the founda
tion of these affirmed rights of the employer. It determined that the
employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking was so great that
bargaining over decisions related to job termination should be re
quired only when the benefits for labor-management relations and
the collective bargaining process outweigh the burdens such a re
quirement would place on the employer's ability to efficiently con
duct business. 113 In applying this test to the issue before it, the Court
examined the needs of both the union and management in order to
108. ld. This is implicit in the Court's analysis:
[T]he present case concerns a third type of management decision, one that had a .
direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the ter
mination, but has as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract
with Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment
relationship.
ld.
109. ld. at 677-79.
ld. at 676.
111. /d. at 678-79.
112. /d. at 678.
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective
discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions
that are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. . . .
This will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amena
ble to resolution through the bargaining process. Management must be free
from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business.
ld. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
113. ld. at 679.
110.
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determine if the benefits to employer-employee relations would out
weigh the burden on managerial decisionmaking. 114
The Court found that the interest of the union in protecting its
employees from discharge could adequately be protected by three
currently available devices without requiring the employer to bar
gain over the decision. I IS The Court noted that the union's interest
in fair dealing was protected by Section 8(a)(3), which prohibits job
elimination decisions based on anti-union animus. 116 Second, the
Court pointed out that the union could seek to negotiate protection
from such decisions into collective bargaining agreements. I 17 Third,
the Court stated that the union has a right to bargain with manage
ment over the effects of the decision on the employees. I IS Based on
these sources of input and control, the Court concluded that it was
unlikely that the additional power to bargain over the decision itself
would increase the flow of information and ideas between the par
ties. 1I9 Instead, the Court feared that granting such a right "could
afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that
might be used to thwart managment's intentions in a manner unre
lated to any feasible solution the union might propose."120
114. Id. at 681; see text accompanying notes 115-27 infra. Justice Brennan, in his
dissent, argued that this test by its very nature "takes into account only the interest of
management; it fails to consider the legitimate employment interest of the workers and
their Union." 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dis
sent, however, did not explain what these interests are and how the majority should have
weighed them. Instead, it disputed the majority's conclusion that the benefits of requir
ing bargaining would be minimal in this case. The dissent pointed to the Chrysler
United Auto Workers wage concession negotiations as an example of the utility of collec
tive bargaining as a means of solving employers financial problems. Id. Justice Bren
nan, however, ignored the crucial fact that the success of these negotiations was achieved
through voluntary, not mandatory, bargaining. The dissent concluded by admonishing
the majority for not deferring to the expertise of the NLRB, but then, in the same breath,
adopted the approach of the Second Circuit rather than that of the NLRB. Id. at 691.
115. 452 U.S. at 681-82.
It is unlikely, however, that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well
as its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions. . . Thus,
although the union has a natural concern that a partial closing decision not be
hastily or unnecessarily entered into, it has some control over the effects of the
decision and indirectly may ensure that the decision itself is deliberately
considered.
Id.
116. Id. at 682.
117. M.
118. Id. at 681-82. For an explanation of the duty to bargain over the effects of the
decision and a comparison to the duty to bargain over the decision itself, see text accom
panying notes 155-62 infra.
119. 452 U.S. at 681; see note 115 supra.
120. 452 U.S. at 683.
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Conversely, the corresponding burden that the duty to bargain
about the decision would place on managerial freedom to act was
found to be too great,l21 The Court recognized that at times man
agement "may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in
meeting business opportunities and exigencies."122 Moreover, the
Court emphasized that the employer's need for certainty in making
rational decisions would be jeopardized by allowing the NLRB or
the courts, with the aid of hindsight, to second-guess the validity of
the employer's reasons for not bargaining over the decision. 123 The
Court pointed out that an employer could be faced with the choice
between the harsh remedies oflarge amounts of back pay,124 reopen
ing a failing operation,125 or the loss of the business opportunity
through the delays and potential economic coercion by the union
during collective bargaining. 126
Based on the belief that imposition on the employer of the duty
to bargain over the decision would impede an employer's ability to
conduct his business profitably, while providing no offsetting benefits
to the interests of the union, the Court held:
The harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely
in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for
economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be
gained through the union's participation in making the decision,
and we hold that the decision itself is not part of § 8(d)'s "terms
and conditions.
"over which Congress has mandated
bargaining. 127

B. Scope

of First National

The Court sought to limit the reach of its holding in First Na
tional by noting immediately that it was not deciding whether other
managerial job elimination decisions, "such as plant relocation,
121. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
122. 452 U.S. at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 683.
[T)he presumption analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals seems ill-suited to
advance harmonious relations between employer and employee. An employer
would have difficulty determining beforehand whether it was faced with a situa
tion requiring bargaining or one that involved economic necessity sufficiently
compelling to obviate the duty to bargain.

Id.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 685.
See text accompanying note 120 supra.
452 U.S. at 686 (citations omitted).
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sales, and other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc.,.
"128
29
are subject to section 8(d)'s duty to bargain.I The reasoning be
hind this holding, however, has broad implications on management's
duty to bargain over such job termination decisions. These words of
limitation cannot diminish the historical significance of the decision,
nor can they efface the reasoning and analysis of the Court.
The Supreme Court emerged from almost two decades of si
lence on employer bargaining duties regarding job termination deci
sions. The Court's holding stands in stark contrast to the broad
readings that the NLRB traditionally, and, the courts recently, have
given to Fibreboard. 130 The Court's balancing test approach rejects
the NLRB's view that job termination decisions necessarily must be
bargained over. The Court interpreted the language of Fibreboard
which stated: "'[T]he words of [§ 8(d)] . . . plainly cover termina
tion of employment. . .''' to require bargaining only over the effects
of the decision on employees, not the decision itself.131 The use by
the courts of appeals of a presumption in favor of bargaining also
was rejected. 132 The Supreme Court reasoned that the freedom to
make major business decisions would be impeded greatly by the un
certainty and risk of harsh NLRB remedies if the employer had to
predict ahead of time whether his factual situation will be found suf
ficiently compelling to obviate the duty to bargain. 133
The balancing approach of the Court, by its very wording,
seems to be the approach advocated for other decisions that directly
eliminate jobs. The Court said: "[I]n view of an employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management deci
sions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-man
agement relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs
the burden placed on the conduct of the business."134 Thus, the
Court appears to have set forth this approach as the proper one, and
rejected the per se and presumption approaches, for other job elimi
128. Id. at 686 n.22. The Court also sought to distinguish Fibreboard on the basis
that employees were not replaced and that non-labor costs were the basis for the decision.
Id. at 688. In addition, the Court reserved judgment on factual situations including
ongoing negotiations, anti-union motivations or collective bargaining agreements. Id.
129. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 77-87, 89-96 supra.
131. 452 U.S. at 681 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964) (brackets in original».
132. Id at 684.
133. Id. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 679.
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nation decisions as well. I35 In decisions involving subcontracting,
plant relocation, automation, mergers, and sales there appears to be
the same need for certainty, speed, secrecy, and flexibility that the
Court weighed so heavily in management's favor in plant closing
situations. In addition, the alternatives that were found to be ade
quate substitutes for the union's power to bargain over the decision
in First National also are present. 136 The timing of First National
and the contrast of the language and concerns of that decision 137
with the language and concerns of the NLRBI38 and, recently, the
courts of appeal 139 lend even greater support to a broad promanage
ment reading of First National.
It is crucial to remember that the Court applied this favorable
language and this balancing approach only to those decisions focus
ing primarily on economic concerns outside of the employer
employee relationship and having a direct impact on terms and con
ditions of employment. 140 This language indicates that decisions
135. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1981). The
Brockway Court held that First National made it clear that economically motivated deci
sions to partially close operations carried no duty to bargain. Id. at 33. This is a reversal
of the Brockway court's trend-setting presumption in favor of bargaining which was
based on its interpretation of Fibreboard. See Advice Memorandum of NLRB General
Counsel, 108 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1981).
"It was also recognized that . . . the Employer . . . abrogated ongoing collective
bargaining negotiations. This factor does not affect our conclusion. . . even though that
factor was noted by the Supreme Court, its holding is First National Maintenance was
deemed a broad one, not limited to the facts before it." Id. at 1072.
In order to assess the impact of First National on pending and future cases. . .
Regional Offices are requested to submit information concerning cases that in
volve the issue of whether an employer has a duty to bargain over the following
decisions if such decisions arguably have an impact on terms and conditions of
employment; plant relocation, sub-contracting, automation, consolidation, sale
of business and partial closure of business. [I]t is recognized that under current
Board law, the general rule is that such decisions are subjectto mandatory bar
gaining. . . However, there is language in the Court's opinion which may alter
the scope of the region's investigation and any litigation which may follow, and
which may even alter the Section 3(d) merit determination [i.e., the merits of
the case] as well. [The Memorandum then cites the language of First Nationafs
balancing test as the reason why the NLRB position on these various manage
ment decisions may be changed]. The Court set forth a test which may apply
generally to the issue of whether management decisions' are subject to
mandatory bargaining.
OFFICE OF THE NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM REGARDING FIRST NA
TIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NLRB, 1, 1-2 (1981).
136. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 108-113 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
140. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
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which focus on some aspect of the employer-employee relationship,
rather than on some independent concern, will not come under the
balancing approach. Instead they would be placed in the category of
decisions that the Court indicates are items on which the employer
must bargain. 141 For example, decisions based on labor costs clearly
are the kind that fall into the category of decisions focusing on some
aspect of the employment relationship. 142 The Supreme Court reem
phasized in First National, as it had seventeen years before in
Fibreboard, that "a desire to reduce labor costs. . . [is] considered a
matter 'peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bar
gaining framework.' "143
First National was expressly limited to job termination decisions
based on nonlabor costs. 144 Therefore, the focus of a job termination
decision and the reasons for it will be the crucial considerations in
determining if a duty to bargain over the decision has arisen. Job
termination decisions that focus on aspects of the employer-em
ployee relationship, such as productivity and labor costs, are likely to
be subject to the duty to bargain. Conversely, job termination deci
sions that focus on matters apart from the employment relationship,
such as market needs, equipment or structural problems, cost of re
141. See notes 104-05, 107 supra and accompanying text.
142. 452 U.S. at 677. This second category of decisions focuses as well as impacts
on some "aspect of the relationship between employer and employees." Id. (quoting
Chemical Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971». Deci
sions which tum on the element of the cost of the employees' labor seem to fall into this
category. But see Advice Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel, 108 L.R.R.M. 1071
(1981), where the General Counsel approved of the ALl's use of a balancing approach to
determine if there was a duty to bargain over a decision to partially close a plant, a
decision that was based in part on labor costs and productivity.
It was recognized that the Employer admitted, during the ALl hearing. . . that
it considered, inter alia, wage rates and productivity of unit employees when
choosing which plant to close, and that in bargaining the Union might have
made sufficient concessions about wage rates and productivity to convince the
Employer to retain operations in the facility. However, it was concluded that
such a possibility was too speculative to outweigh the factors described above,
especially in light of the Supreme Court's broad holding [in First National] that
an Employer is privileged to decide to close part of its business without bargain
ing with a union.
Id. at 1072. Note, however, that this is mere dicta from a non-binding interagency advi
sory opinion and that ii is unknown if labor cost and productivity were major or minor
factors in the company's decision.
143. 452 U.S. at 680 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
at 210).
144. Id. at 687-88. "[P]etitioner's dispute with Greenpark was solely over the size
of the management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no control or
authority over that fee. . . These facts in particular distinguish this case from the subcon
tracting issue presented in Fibreboard." Id
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source considerations, tax consequences, and direct government reg
ulations, are unlikely to come under the duty to bargain.
C.

Considerationsfor Practitioners

In order to evaluate the practical consequences from the impact
of First National, one must understand what is required by the duty
to bargain. The duty to bargain simply is a duty to negotiate in good
faith; it does not entail a duty to agree or concede. 145 This good faith
standard requires the parties: To engage in the discussion of issues
with an open mind;146 to provide the other party with all relevant
information and reasoning regarding their positions; 147 and to listen
and give due consideration to the positions of the other party.'48 If
agreement is not reached and the parties are deadlocked after com
plying with all good faith requirements, they are considered to be at
an impasse.'49 Once an impasse occurs, management is free to im
plement its decision. 150 The union has a number of possible options
once impasse is reached; it may accede to the change or, if a griev
ance procedure is in effect, it may file a grievance over the change.
In addition, the union may strike if there is no contract in effect or if
the contract does not preclude a strike. J5J
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 158(d) makes it clear that "such an obliga
tion does not compel either party to agree to any proposal or require the making of any
concession." Id. It imposes instead a duty "to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, arid other terms and conditions of employment
. . . ." Id.
146. The NLRB has always construed section 8(a)(5) to require more than the
mere meeting of the parties. It also requires them to have a "serious intent to adjust
differences and reach an acceptable common ground." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l.
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (quoting from I N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 85-86).
147. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956), the landmark case in
the area of the duty to provide information. See also Industrial Welding Co., 175
N.L.R.B. 78 (1969); Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
148. See, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC
TIVE BARGAINING 481-82 (1976); c. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 271-347
(1971); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958), for a
detailed discussion of the duty to bargain in good faith.
149. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enforced sub nom., AF
TRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968) for a complete discussion of the elements
of impasse and the rights of the parties upon impasse.
150. R. GORMAN, supra note 148. "The law is clear that an employer may, after
bargaining with the union to a deadlock or impasse on an issue, make unilateral changes
that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals." Id at 445 (quot
ing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967».
151. 28 U.S.c. § 158(a) (1976) gives the employees a right to strike as a form of
protected concerted activity. Id. Therefore, unless employees are under the terms of a
contract that prohibits them from striking, they are free to do so.

1982]

f)UTY TO BARGAIN

535

This duty to. bargain exists for all job termination decisions.
The burdens this duty to bargain places on managerial freedom de
pend upon whether the employer is required to bargain over the de
cision itself or merely over the effects of the decisions. There is
always a duty to bargain over any effects of a management decision
on the terms and conditions of employment of current employees. ls2
It does not follow, however, that there automatically is a duty to
bargain over the decision itself.
Bargaining over the effects of a decision focuses on the impact
of the employer's decision on the terms and conditions of employ
ment of the employees. This kind of bargaining requires an em
ployer to notify the employee representative that a particular change
will be forthcoming, prior to its implementation, but subsequent to
the decision to make the change. ls3 The employer then must bargain
in good faith over the impact of the decision on the terms and condi
tions of employment. The issues that typically will be raised and
discussed are: The possibility of the transfer of affected employees to
other facilities owned by the employer; reassignment of employees to
other duties within the facility; the order of layoff, if any; future obli
gations concerning pensions; and payment of severance pay to dis
charged employees. ls4 Agreement or impasse typically will be
reached quickly as there are only these few issues involved and the
scope of possible discussion and negotiation, therefore, is limited.
If an employer is required to bargain over the decision as well
152. 452 u.s. at 681. "There is no dispute that the union must be given a signifi
cant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the 'effects'
bargaining mandated by § 8(a)(5)." Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing
Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.
1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
153. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961), rey'd on olher
grounds, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). "The decision . . . was not a required subject of collective
bargaining. . . However, once that decision is made § 8(a)(5) requires that notice of it be
given to the union so that the negotiators could then consider the treatment due to those
employees whose conditions of employment would be . . . changed . . ." Id. See OF
FICE OF THE NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM REGARDING FIRST NATIONAL
MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NLRB (1981).
With particular respect to mandatory bargaining about the effects of a decision,
the Court stated that the union must be given a 'significant opportunity' to bar
gain. In this regard, early notification of the decision is essential. Quite obvi
ously, it is during the period between notification and effectuation of a decision
that the union can have a 'significant opportunity' to engage in 'collective dis
cussions' with the employer and, if necessary, to have those discussions 'backed
by. . . economic weapons.'
. .
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
154. See 5 T. KHEEL, supra note 97 at 145-51.
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as its effects, additional burdens of bargaining are imposed. Fore
most among these additional burdens is the duty to bargain before a
decision can be made. When management seriously considers a
change, it must notify the union and agree to bargain until impasse
or agreement over the contemplated change. 155 The reasoning be
hind the change must be discussed and carefully analyzed. The em
ployer must have data to support the asserted reasons for the
decision and the data must be made available to the union for analy
sis and discussion. 156 Alternative solutions to the problem that has
brought about the need for a change also must be completely evalu
ated. 157 This process is broad in scope and can consume a great deal
of time before impasse or agreement is reached. The opportunity or
solution the employer needed may be lost in this process or increased
in expense such that it is no longer feasible. 15s The news of the con
templated change also may cause the premature loss of suppliers and
customers and greatly reduce productivity.159 In addition, the threat
and use of the union's strike weapon can have a highly restraining
effect on the employer's freedom to manage and on the free flow of
commerce, as it may coerce the employer into foregoing necessary
changes or opportunities. 160
155. 29 u.s.c. 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ
ees..." about items within the scope of Section 8(d)'s terms and conditions of employ
ment. Id. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962), held that an
employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment is in fact a refusal to bargain
and hence a violation of Section 8(a)(5). If a decision is considered a condition of em
ployment, it cannot be made without first bargaining with the union to impasse. Id. at
745.
156. See note 147 supra; see also General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177,
1182 (6th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir.
1969).
157. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
158. Brief for petitioner at 18, First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner). "[D)elay ... which may occur if
such closure is subject to [a) mandatory [duty to bargain) ... and may lead to increased
losses compounded by interim departure to key personnel; declining productivity on ac
count of reduced morale; security problems and perhaps sabotage while a confrontation
ensues at the bargaining table." Id.
159. Id See note 158 supra.
160. Brief for Petitioner at 19, supra note 158. See Comment, Partial Termina
tions-A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REV.
1089 (1967).
[T)here is a need to protect capital investment decisions from the influence of
labor. It is essential to the proper functioning of the economy that capital be
free to flow from one use to another. Not only does this free flow of capital
cause the economy to adjust to the desires of the consumer, but reallocating a
given amount of capital from a low yielding use to a higher yielding use results
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While it is true that bargaining over the effects also can result in
delays, cause damage from news of these decisions, and cause
strikes, the impact is much less detrimental. 161 When there is a duty
to bargain over the effects only, the decision can be made before
bargaining even begins. In situations wherein bargaining over the
decision is required, the decision is held in limbo and the employer
must wait until impasse or agreement is reached before solid com
mitments or plans can be made. 162 Therefore, delays, information
leaks, and strike threats make the employer vulnerable and he may
have to forego a change that is necessary to the continued viability of
the firm.
Once the requirements and burdens of the duty to bargain are
understood and evaluated, the employer must consider the likeli
hood that he will be required to bargain over a contemplated deci
sion. This requires that he look at more than an analysis of the First
National rationale in a theoretical setting. He also must evaluate the
following three practical considerations. First, the contract must be
examined to determine whether it has language regarding the con
templated decision. The contract can render the interpretation of
First National and section 8(a)(5) irrelevant either by allowing a uni
lateral decision or by prohibiting a change altogether. 163 Second, the
in a net increment to national income and given a fixed amount of resources,
increases the efficiency of the enterprise and the economy.
Id. at 1091 (citations omitted).
161. When the employer is free to make the decision before he is required to bar
gain he is allowed to contractually secure his opportunities. The burdens of then having
to bargain over the effects are much lighter. The delays of bargaining are much shorter
because the realm of issues is narrowly confined to the impact ofthe decision on employ
ees "terms and conditions of employment." Further, the delays will not cause the opor
tunity to be lost, because it has already been secured by contract. Therefore, the damage
that a strike or leaked information can cause is limited. The only issue left concerns how
soon the change will be made. The damage, therefore, would be limited to a short delay
in decision implementation. The lesser impact on management of the duty to bargain
over the effects of the decision rather than the decision itself was recognized by the Court
in First National. 452 U.S. at 683; see note 162 infra ..
162. The Supreme Court in First National explicitly recognized this in their state
ment that the granting of the right to bargain over the decision "could afford a union a
powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's
intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose." 452
U.S. at 683.
163. See C. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 333. "A party may contractually waive its
right to bargain about a particular mandatory subject. Where such an assertion is raised,
the test has been whether the waiver is in 'clear and unmistakable' language." Id. (cita
tion omitted). See, e.g., NLRB v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1964);
Druwhit Metal Products Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 346 (1965); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147
N.L:R.B. 1506 (1964).

538

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:513

actions of the union must be evaluated. If the union is notified of
planned change but fails to make a timely request of management to
bargain, it may have waived the right to bargain over the decision. 164
Finally, the employer must consider the realities of labor relations
litigation. The NLRB tends to construe court decisions in a light'
favorable to union and employee interests. 165. Therefore, the scope
of First National may be narrowly interpreted and confined to its
particular facts. 166 The employer contemplating other kinds of job
termination decisions, therefore, must consider the risk of being
found by the NLRB to have violated section 8(a)(5). If this risk is
substantial, he must decide whether the costs and delays of appeal
ing an unfavorable NLRB decision to the more management ori
ented courts outweigh the need to be free from the constraints of
decision bargaining. If so, the logical decision is to negotiate over
the job termination decision, even though the right not to negotiate
may be meritorious under the First National rationale. These practi
cal issues must be evaluated carefully. They can change a situation
from one that, under the Supreme Court approach in First National,
would be free from the duty to bargain, into one in which the deci
sion should be bargained over.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the first time in almost two decades, the Supreme Court has
directly addressed the issue of an employer's duty to bargain over
decisions that result in the termination of employees. The NLRB
had interpreted Fibreboard, the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in this area, to say that "terms and conditions of employment" under
section 8(d) required bargaining over all job termination deci
sions. 167 The courts of appeals, until recently, had rejected the
NLRB's broad interpretation of Fibreboard and concluded instead
164. See Subcontracting, supra note 45, at 246.
[T)he defense of waiver of the right to bargain is available to an employer under
circumstances in which he is able to show that the union has clearly waived its
right to negotiate based upon . . . failure of the union to pursue negotiations
following timely notification and the opportunity to bargain pertaining to the
employer's tentative decision.
fd.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Spun-lee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967); Key Coal
Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1979).
165. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
166. There is some indication that the NLRB may interpret First National broadly,
see note 142 supra. This possibility may be significantly strengthened by the recent ap
pointment of two new members to the NLRB's National board, both of whom have
management oriented backgrounds.
167. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
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that Fibreboard exempted from the duty to bargain employee termi
nation decisions based on factors outside the employer-employee re
lationship that affect the basic scope and direction of the
enterprise. 168
In First National, the Supreme Court has affirmed the tradi
tional approach of the courts and rejected both the longstanding per
se approach of the NLRB and the recent trend of the courts toward a
rebuttable presumption in favor of bargaining. 169 In First National,
the Court held that the employer's decision to terminate its mainte
nance contract and to discharge its thirty-five employees was not
subject to the duty to bargain. 170 The language of the Court's bal
ancing approach and the underlying concerns appear to be equally
applicable to other decisions that focus on matters outside the em
ployer-employee relationship and result in the discharge of employ
ees. The Court's concerns regarding the burdens on management,
the marginal benefits to the union, and the lack of amenability of the
issue to the bargaining process would appear to be the same for other
job termination decisions such as automation, plant relocation, plant
sale or merger, and subcontracting. l7l The actual impact of this de
cision, however, will depend on a number of practical considera
tions, the most crucial of which is how receptive the NLRB is to the
policies and concerns the Supreme Court has delineated in First
National.
Michael P. Sheridan
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text accompanying notes 74-76, 88 supra.
text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
U.S. at 686.
notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text.

